By Andrew Macdonald
- Baltimore Bridge Collapse: Could It Happen Here? Well, It Also Happened In Georgia In 1971
Doing some deep digging to find out more about how a National Gypsum vessel crashed onto Halifax’s George’s Island in contemporary times, I still need to do more digging.
But, my research led me to a court case dating way back to 1971, in an American port, after a gypsum carrier hit a bridge, and the Georgia bridge collapsed.
The Pacific Carrier in 1971 carried gypsum from the Port of Halifax – there are several gypsum mines in NS which are shipped to ports in America. The Pacific Carrier sailed between Halifax and the Savannah River. It was operated by National Gypsum, which has operations in Halifax’s Bedford Basin. The Pacific Carrier in 1971 hit a bridge in the Savannah River, taking it down, as the Seaboard Coastline Railroad Company Bridge collapsed into the Georgia river when it was hit by the gypsum ship.
Given what happened in Baltimore, with the deadly collapse of the Francis Scott Key Bridge, after a 10,000 TEU (ship measurement for container boxes) hit its pier and the bridge fell into Patapsco River and outer Baltimore Harbour, it is a topical issue for the Port of Halifax.
That’s because container ships head under the two Halifax bridges all the time, sailing to the Fairview Cove Container Terminal which was built in 1982.
While digging for information on a 15-year-old story involving a vessel departing National Gypsum’s facility at Bedford Basin ending up crashing on George’s Island, my research led me to a 1971-1979 court case in the United States – with connections to the Port of Halifax.
“In threatening weather, unfavourable tide and with a tornado watch in effect for the immediate area, the 580 foot Pacific Carrier headed out to sea on the night of April 23, 1971,” states the court case.
“Shortly after she was undocked a very heavy rainfall commenced. About one mile from where the vessel had undocked she collided with the Seaboard Coastline Railroad Company bridge spanning the Savannah River nearly opposite the Union Camp Corporation,” the archived documents read. Union Camp was a pulp and paper mill.
“The Pacific Carrier completely missed the channel opening in the bridge and knocked the structure into the river.”
There was litigation against the ship Pacific Carrier, the U.S. government sued the shipping owner, as did other ship companies using that Georgia port.
“The vessel petitioned for exoneration from and limitation of liability. Several claims were made by other vessels and companies for damages caused by the delay that ensued in clearing the wreckage so as to make the channel navigable,” wrote the judge in that case.
“The vessel’s claim against such third-party defendants is that smoke from the stacks of the pulp mill suddenly obstructed vision from the bridge and that the U.S. Coast Guard negligently failed to require adequate lighting to mark the 200-foot opening in the lift,” the judge explained.
The judge cited previous case laws. “It ruled that industrial smoke obscuring navigable waters constitutes a navigational hazard within the admiralty jurisdiction.”
The case was tried in court in 1975 and 1976 and was subsequently settled out of court, except for two parties, including the US Coast Guard.
Oceanic Carrier, Inc. owned the Pacific Carrier which at the time of the collision was being operated by Gypsum Carrier, Inc.
“The vessel was chartered to Caribbean Steamship Company for the purpose of shipping gypsum from Halifax to Savannah.
“The Pacific Carrier is of Liberian registry. Her overall length is 579.83 feet, and her beam is 72.18 feet. It is diesel-powered and propelled by a single right-hand screw. The bridge is located aft. The port anchor and chain had been lost in February 1971. It was not replaced. However, the ship remained in class with the American Bureau of Shipping under the condition that the anchor be replaced as quickly as possible,” the judge said.
“The vessel carried a full complement of twenty-seven men and nine officers. She was completing her third voyage between Halifax and Savannah since March 24, 1971,” added the judge.
“The Pacific Carrier docked at National Gypsum Company approximately one mile upstream from the Seaboard bridge on April 21, 1971, and proceeded to discharge her cargo,” the judge explained.
I should note National Gypsum operates a facility at Bedford Basin in Halifax Harbour.
The Pacific Carrier vessel took down a “vertical lift drawbridge which provided a rail connection between the mainland and Hutchinson Island in the Savannah River. Its two-hundred-foot opening is located in the center of the four hundred-foot ship channel,” stated the judge.
“The bridge had been rammed by a vessel in 1966 and was badly damaged in the collision. A year later, the fender system was grazed by the Partula while piloted by Mr. Harry J. Padgett, the Georgia judge noted.
“Following the 1966 collision, the bridge was repaired. Its design as originally built and as the structure was rebuilt after the collision, was formally approved by the Coast Guard,” the court documents read.
“The Coast Guard approved the same type of lights for the rebuilt structure which were on the bridge prior to the 1966 collision. At the time of the 1971 collision, the lights in question fulfilled Coast Guard Regulations. There were four red pier protection lights, one on each fender; two red pier lights, one on each pier; and two green lift span lights,” said the judge.
“At the time of the collision, the Coast Guard had approved and Seaboard had installed temporary red flashing lights on the north side because of dredging operations in the Savannah River.”
As for the reference of Union Camp Corp, at the time of the ship collision, it operated a pulp, paper, and bag manufacturing plant on the south bank of the Savannah River.
“Smoke emitted during the manufacturing process sometimes obscures the Seaboard bridge. Following the 1966 collision, the United States Coast Guard was requested to improve the lighting on the bridge. River pilots had complained that smoke and fog were encountered at that point more frequently than elsewhere and that the condition impeded navigation. The Savannah Port Authority requested the Coast Guard to investigate the situation,” the judge added.
The Union Camp plant was regarded by many persons working on the riverfront to be the major contributor to the smoke and haze problem in the vicinity of the bridge, wrote the judge.
“A Coast Guard officer discussed the matter with plant officials. After conducting its own study, Union Camp denied that the emissions obstructed navigation. The Coast Guard took no further action other than refusing to approve the experimental use of fog penetrating lights on the bridge.”
After the discharge of mined gypsum, the Pacific Carrier vessel on April 23rd, at 9:30 pm was ready to leave port.
“About that time, H.J. Padgett, the senior Savannah River pilot in point of service, came aboard. Padgett prepared to take the vessel out at once although there existed at the time a maximum ebb tide in the direction of the bridge. There was no urgency which necessitated immediate sailing. Weather conditions, as stated, were extremely unstable.”
At that point, the vessel was cargo-free.
As it was preparing to leave port, an earlier tornado warning remained in effect. Winds had gusted to 65 knots.
“From the place where the Pacific Carrier was docked, Padgett could see the lights on the bridge. Visibility was unrestricted up to five miles. The wind was moderate from the northeast, blowing industrial smoke from Union Camp away from the river.”
Pilot Padgett in his court deposition stated:
“We had already passed the dredge Pullen. We had just passed the American Oil dock, and I checked ahead to the center of the draw and I asked the Quartermaster, I said, “What’s your heading?’ and he told me, as near as I remember, he said `142,’ and I immediately stepped back and looked at it myself to be sure there was no mistake, and that instant we had a sudden shift in the wind and a heavy rain and a dense smoke came down on us without a minute’s warning whatsoever and it blotted out all visibility. It was the most dense smoke I had ever seen, and there was nothing to do but to proceed on because of the size of the ship and I was too near the bridge to have done anything different or attempted to do anything different.”
“Jason Woods, who was tender on the Seaboard bridge, testified that he could see the Pacific Carrier when the tug towed her into the channel. “And, there was a period of time that I lost it. It completely blacked out. . . .” “[T]here was a thunder cloud in progress. Smoke settled in the river.” “I was still in my tower, looking out the window to upstream — up west, and when his mast pole lights appeared through the smoke and rain, whatever, I had to make a getaway, and I knew he was off course, and I had to make a getaway.” He ran for safety. According to Woods, the smoke was upriver of the bridge and was from the Union Camp plant.”
“Captain Padgett thus described the subsequent events:
“[A]t the last moments I observed this green light up in the sky, which I knew, or I thought, was the center of the lift span. There was no way I could tell how far ahead those lights were, and I realized by the way it lined up that the ship was too much to the right, so I immediately put the wheel hard over to the port and I said `half ahead’ and then I immediately said `full ahead’, and I don’t think it was but just a few seconds after that before we struck the bridge.”
“When Padgett saw the green lift span light, he realized that the vessel was to the right of the draw and ordered “hard aport-half ahead” to correct the error. He then ordered “full ahead . . . to try to bring the ship back more to port in the draw.” Before the “full ahead” order was executed, the Pacific Carrier struck the bridge. It was then doing approximately eight knots,” noted the judge.
“The Pacific Carrier struck the main span between the first main pier supporting the draw on the south side and the next pier south. The impact collapsed the south tower, which supported the draw, as well as the draw into the river. After the collision, Padgett ordered the ship’s engines stopped. The vessel floated through the breach in the bridge structure and emerged downstream of the bridge,” the judge wrote.
“S.G. Gojkogoseobneeic, Master of the Pacific Carrier, testified that “there was a shift in the wind and became a heavy rain and the smoke from the mill which is in the southern part was there.” When the vessel hit the smoke, he noticed that the pilot looked at the radar. The Captain of the vessel admitted that he never considered corrective action even after the emergency became apparent. His role was an entirely passive one.”
The judge wrote: “For all practical purposes the bridge was a total loss. After the collision, the Coast Guard declared the bridge an obstruction to navigation. It was not rebuilt. The debris was completely removed from the site.”
“In addition to the claim for damages to the bridge, Pacific Carrier settled all claims for freight and demurrage by ships delayed as a result of the blocking of the channel by the wreckage, and assignments to the shipowner and charterer were taken in each instance,” said the court decision.
“Harry J. Padgett, Jr., who was the senior Savannah River pilot in years of service with the Savannah Pilot’s Association, was too ill to testify at trial. His deposition had been taken on October 11, 1971, less than six months after the accident. It was introduced at trial as Plaintiff’s Exhibit 59. Padgett had become a Master of tugs and docking pilot in 1935 and received his pilot’s license in 1945. Prior to the collision, he had piloted the Pacific Carrier twice. He thought the ship handled well. He had had no problems with the crew.”
“Padgett arrived at the National Gypsum dock about 9:20 P.M. and was aware that a tornado watch was in effect. On his arrival, “It was raining but not hard.” When he boarded the Pacific Carrier at 9:30, visibility was good. There was a strong ebb tide. The Captain, the helmsman, and the docking master were inside the bridge when the ship undocked.”
“According to Padgett, visibility was suddenly obscured by “a sudden shift in the wind and a heavy rain and a dense smoke came down on us without a minute’s warning whatsoever and it blotted out all visibility.” When the smoke enveloped the vessel, Padgett glanced at the radar. It was “snowed in.” “I could not make anything out insofar [as] the opening in the draw was concerned.” However, he “was not relying on the radar. I was relying on the visibility to see the lights on the bridge.”
Industrial landscape with an excavator and a large truck working in a gypsum quarry in the summer. Gypsum is mined in NS and carried by vessels out of Halifax Harbour to ports in America. Istock image.
The judge wrote: “Padgett did not see fit to take corrective action. When the vessel was what he estimated to be four or five ship lengths from the bridge, he could see no lights. “[B]ecause of the width of the channel and the strong current, following current, we didn’t have anchoring room, didn’t have swinging room, and our only chance of not having an accident was to proceed on.”
“Captain William T. Brown, Master Pilot, testified that dropping anchor and reversing the engines at that stage would have caused the vessel to hit the bridge broadside. If the ship had been beached on the north bank, she would have swung around and struck the bridge.”
“Several other pilots testified at trial. They were practically unanimous that under the circumstances existing on April 23rd (1971) they would have successfully piloted the Pacific Carrier through the bridge. They were also in agreement that once the heavy obscuration set in, no corrective action was feasible. Like Padgett, they would have attempted to proceed through the draw. George E. Henry, a bar pilot for twenty-five years, agreed on cross-examination that pilots simply gamble that the smoke will abate in time for the ship to clear the draw.”
“There was testimony that Padgett could have dropped anchor and reversed engines or that he could have beached the vessel on the north side of the river. The weight of the evidence, however, is that such actions would have been ineffective and would have resulted in greater damage to the ship.”
Claims Against the US Coast Guard
“Essentially, the claim against the United States Coast Guard is that it was negligent in failing to require improved lighting and radar reflectors on the bridge. Early in 1967, the Savannah Ports Authority requested the Coast Guard to consider improved lighting for the Seaboard Bridge. It replied that it could not require the owner to install lights other than those required by its Regulations. The Coast Guard was aware that one source of obscuration was smoke from Union Camp’s stacks,” the judge observed.
“Although other complaints were received, the Coast Guard approved the installation of lights on the bridge as they existed prior to the 1966 collision. The lights in place and in operation at the time of the collision complied with the minimum standards required by the Coast Guard. A representative discussed pollution control with Union Camp officials and toured the plant. The Coast Guard took no action until sometime in 1970. At that time it was suggested to Seaboard by Ports Authority officials that large street lights be installed on the bridge.”
“Seaboard agreed to do so if the Coast Guard approved same. However, the latter responded that it did not ‘officially approve lights of this type which are not prescribed in the U.S. Coast Guard Aids to Navigation Regulation CG-208.’”
Judge’s findings of fact
“Pacific Carrier and Union Camp were jointly negligent and the fault of each concurred in and contributed to the collision with the bridge,” concluded the judge in 1979.
“While there was testimony by Union Camp witnesses that the very heavy rain caused loss of visibility, the preponderance of the evidence is that the mixture of rain and smoke produced the obscuration that concealed the opening in the bridge,” said the judge’s decision.
“The respective percentages of vessel and industry negligence for the collision and damage to the bridge are as follows: Pacific Carrier eighty percent (80%); Union Camp twenty percent (20%).
“In arriving at these percentages of fault, this Court has considered the faulty judgment of the Pacific Carrier and its river pilot; the fact of colliding with a stationary object; persistence in following a 142-degree course toward the opening in spite of the known cross current sheering a vessel to starboard in approaching same; lack of proper lookout and equipment and inability or failure to take reasonable measures to stop the progress of the vessel when smoke first enshrouded it.”
“The Coast Guard approved the bridge structure and the lighting. 14 U.S.C. § 81. The lighting on the bridge complied with existing Coast Guard regulations. 33 C.F.R. § 68.15-20. The Coast Guard was under no affirmative duty to direct increased lighting or to install radar reflectors,” explained the judge.
“Pacific Carrier and Union Camp are jointly liable for the damage caused by the collision with the Seaboard bridge and the respective negligence of each concurred in contributing thereto,” said the judge’s decision.
“The Coast Guard was not negligent in failing to order additional lighting on the bridge or in failing to install radar reflectors.”
“A vessel that strikes a stationary object is presumptively at fault. Under such circumstances, the ship is prima facie negligent,” the judge concluded.
“A pilot is under a duty “to avoid or minimize the chance of harm to” his vessel or other objects…”Where the current is such as to require a vessel to exceed the proper speed in a fog to maintain steerageway, that vessel should not be underway in the first place.”
“A pilot must be aware of local conditions, including cross currents,” said the judge. (Pilot) Padgett was negligent in maintaining a course heading of 142 degrees after the obscuration. The decision ignored the existence of the cross current existing near the draw which was known to him. Failure to correct the bearing in order to compensate for the cross current was one of the proximate causes of the collision.”
The Pacific Carrier was at fault for not having its radar properly manned, the judicial decision said. He also found it at fault for not having a proper lookout on the gypsum vessel.
“A manufacturer which negligently allows industrial emissions to obstruct a navigable waterway is liable for damages caused thereby….Union Camp was aware that smoke from its stacks and vents frequently obscured the bridge. It was at fault in failing to take any action to minimize the condition created by its mill effluent.”
The damages sought by the Seaboard bridge owner amounted to $5M The amount paid by the shipowner and charterer in settlement thereof was $2,75M. There is nothing of record to show the amounts paid to claimants in settling the several claims for delay and demurrage, stated the judge.
